PostgreSQL

A postgres lane decodes the PostgreSQL v3 frontend/backend protocol: every statement a client sends, and every row the server returns. It is the lane the compose stack demonstrates and the one Running the Sidecar builds step by step.

config.yaml

listeners:
  - name: appdb
    protocol: postgres
    listen: 127.0.0.1:15432
    upstream: appdb:5432
    upstream_tls:                        # optional: encrypt the hop to the database
      ca_file: /etc/hoop-inspect/certs/appdb.crt
    guardrails:
      rules:
        - name: no-destructive-sql
          type: operation
          operations: [drop, delete, truncate]
          message: destructive statements are not permitted on appdb

What the codec reads

Two message types carry SQL, and the codec reads both:

Message	Carries
`Q` Query	The simple protocol: one string, possibly several statements separated by semicolons
`P` Parse	The extended protocol: the prepared statement drivers and ORMs use

The codec skips everything else by length, so a bulk COPY stream costs no memory. It reassembles a statement split across TCP segments before classifying it. The codec splits a multi-statement Q message with PostgreSQL’s own lexical rules (dollar quoting, standard-conforming strings, nested comments) and evaluates each statement on its own. Operation is the statement’s most consequential effect, so a DELETE hidden inside a CTE classifies as delete; see the worked example.

CALL and EXECUTE report unknown, because their bodies live in the catalog and no parser can say what they touch. To catch them, write operations: [call, unknown].

TLS on each leg

pgwire negotiates TLS in-band: the client sends an 8-byte SSLRequest and waits for a one-byte reply. That shapes both ends of the lane.

Leg	Options
client → lane	Plaintext (`PGSSLMODE=disable`), Envoy’s contrib `postgres_proxy` + `starttls` socket, or the lane itself via `downstream_tls`
lane → database	Plaintext, or `upstream_tls`: the Sidecar sends the `SSLRequest`, then handshakes as an ordinary TLS client

postgres is one of two protocols that may terminate the client’s TLS at the lane (the other is grpc), because no generic proxy in front can speak the in-band exchange:

config.yaml

listeners:
  - name: appdb
    protocol: postgres
    listen: 0.0.0.0:15432
    upstream: appdb:5432
    downstream_tls:
      cert_file: /etc/hoop-inspect/certs/lane.crt
      key_file: /etc/hoop-inspect/certs/lane.key

Clients then connect with PGSSLMODE=require and the gate still reads plaintext, because the lane decrypts what it terminates. Two upstream details:

A refusal fails the connection. If the server answers N to the SSLRequest, the lane errors out instead of downgrading. You asked for an encrypted hop, and a downgrade would send credentials in the clear without telling you.
The Sidecar strips channel binding. It removes SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS from the server’s SASL offer, because channel binding ties SCRAM to a single TLS session and a terminating relay has two. Plain SCRAM-SHA-256 remains and authenticates the same password against the same verifier, so you change no credential and no server setting.

Masking

Every row and column in a pgwire DataRow is length-prefixed, so the codec re-frames: it rebuilds each message around the rewritten values, and a mask that grows or shrinks a value cannot desynchronize the client. Both rule shapes work:

mask:
  rules:
    - {name: ssn-column, columns: [ssn], strategy: partial, keep_last: 4}
    - {name: emails, entities: [EMAIL_ADDRESS], strategy: redact}

Column rules match the names in the result set’s RowDescription, and wherever the protocol names its values they beat detection.

Denials

A denied statement returns a real pgwire ErrorResponse carrying the rule’s message, so the developer reads it in psql instead of watching the socket drop:

FATAL:  destructive statements are not permitted on appdb

Severity is FATAL rather than ERROR because the connection closes with the denial; ERROR would leave psql waiting for a ReadyForQuery that never arrives.

The Envoy lane

Envoy has no pgwire parser, so the lane is plain tcp_proxy and the Sidecar sees every byte Envoy could not examine:

envoy.yaml

listeners:
  - name: postgres_ingress
    address:
      socket_address: { address: 0.0.0.0, port_value: 5432 }
    filter_chains:
      - filters:
          - name: envoy.filters.network.tcp_proxy
            typed_config:
              "@type": type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.network.tcp_proxy.v3.TcpProxy
              stat_prefix: ingress_pg
              cluster: hoop_inspect_pg

To terminate the client’s TLS in Envoy instead of at the lane, use the contrib postgres_proxy filter with a starttls transport socket. Terminating client TLS has the full shape and its caveats. Try it end to end with the compose stack in deploy/docker-compose/envoy-stack/: its appdb lane runs this protocol with upstream_tls on and masking live.

Running the Sidecar

Builds a Postgres lane from zero, behind Envoy, with the compose stack to prove it.

Guardrail Rules

Every rule type this lane evaluates, including deferring a match to Rego.

Getting Started

Core Concepts

Features

Control Plane Setup

Sidecar Reference

What the codec reads

TLS on each leg

Masking

Denials

The Envoy lane

Next

Running the Sidecar

Guardrail Rules

​What the codec reads

​TLS on each leg

​Masking

​Denials

​The Envoy lane

​Next

Running the Sidecar

Guardrail Rules

What the codec reads

TLS on each leg

Masking

Denials

The Envoy lane

Next